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Local lenders lent locally, and local 
conditions caused local problems. 
And in the early 20th century, that was 
largely how Americans bought homes.
In Adam McKay’s movie The Big 
Short (Plan B Entertainment 2015), 
the character Jared Vennett is based 
on Greg Lippmann, a former Deutsche 
Bank trader who made well over a bil-
lion dollars for his employer by betting 
against subprime mortgages before 
the market collapse. Vennett demon-
strates with a set of stacked wooden 
blocks how the modern housing inance 
market has been built on a shaky 
foundation:
This is a basic mortgage bond. 
The original ones were simple, 
thousands of AAA mortgages 
bundled together and sold with 
a guarantee from the US govern-
ment. But the modern-day ones 
are private and are made up of 
layers of tranches, with the AAA 
highest-rated getting paid irst 
and the lowest, B-rated getting 
paid last and taking on defaults 
irst.
Obviously if you’re buying B-lev-
els you can get paid more. Hey, 
they’re risky, so sometimes they 
fail. . . .
Somewhere along the line these B 
and BB level tranches went from 
risky to dog [excrement]. I’m talk-
ing rock-bottom FICO scores, no 
income veriication, adjustable 
rates. . . dog [excrement]. Default 
rates are already up from one to 
four percent. If they rise to eight 
percent—and they will—a lot of 
these BBBs are going to zero.
Ater the whole set of blocks comes 
crashing down, someone watching Ven-
nett’s presentation asks, “What’s that?” 
He responds, “That is America’s housing 
market.”
Global lenders lent globally, and 
global conditions caused global and 
local problems. And in the early twenty-
irst century, that was largely how 
Americans bought homes. This article 
provides an overview of the strengths 
and weaknesses of each aspect of the 
housing inance system in order to 
enable discussion of how to design a 
T
wo movie scenes can bookend 
the last hundred years of hous-
ing inance. In Frank Capra’s It’s a 
Wonderful Life (RKO Radio Pictures Inc. 
1946), George Bailey speaks to panicked 
depositors demanding their money 
back from Bailey Bros. Building and 
Loan. This tiny thrit in the little town 
of Bedford Falls had closed its doors 
ater it had to repay a large loan and 
temporarily ran out of money to return 
to its depositors. George tells them:
You’re thinking of this place all 
wrong. As if I had the money back 
in a safe. The money’s not here. 
Your money’s in Joe’s house…
right next to yours. And in the 
Kennedy house, and Mrs. Mack-
lin’s house, and a hundred others. 
Why, you’re lending them the 
money to build, and then, they’re 
going to pay it back to you as best 
they can.
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Homes are generally the 
single biggest investment 
that families make and 
are potential engines of 
wealth creation. 
stronger system for the rest of the 21st 
Century. For a much more extensive 
treatment of this topic, see the author’s 
forthcoming book, Paying for The Ameri-
can Dream: How To Reform The Market 
for Mortgages (Oxford University Press, 
2019).
Heart of the American Dream
So how did we get from the housing 
inance system in It’s a Wonderful Life 
to the one in The Big Short? And what 
are the consequences of that journey? 
The system was not perfect when mort-
gages came from lenders like Bailey 
Bros. Building and Loan and neither is 
today’s version when borrowers access 
the global capital markets.
Although the 2008 inancial crisis 
splashed residential housing inance 
across the front page day ater day, 
many people still ind the topic pretty 
murky. Yet it is important to our 
lives, because fewer than 63 percent 
of Americans—a recent low—owned 
their homes in 2016. U.S. Census 
Bureau, Quarterly Residential Vacan-
cies and Homeownership, Third Quarter 
2018, Table 4 (Oct. 30, 2018) (Release 
Number CB18-161). This was down 
from an all-time high of 69 percent 
in 2006. Id. For most people, home-
ownership carries strong emotional 
connotations, forming the heart of the 
American Dream. If we are fortunate, 
our home is the place where we feel saf-
est, the place we share with our loved 
ones, the place we raise our children. 
The drop in homeownership rates over 
the last decade means that millions 
fewer households own the place where 
they live. There are 127 million house-
holds in the United States, so even a 
one percentage point change in the 
homeownership rate afects more than 
a million households. Statista, Num-
ber of Households in the U.S. from 1960 
to 2018, The Statistics Portal, https://
www.statista.com/statistics/183635/
number-of-households-in-the-us/ (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2019). People may not 
get the same warm feeling about their 
rented or shared home that they would 
get from owning their home.
People burned by underwater mort-
gages, defaults, and foreclosures have 
seen their version of the American 
Dream betrayed. Entire communi-
ties—especially African-American 
communities—have seen their home 
equity evaporate in the face of falling 
housing prices and other big shocks to 
the local economy. These shocks were 
sometimes compounded by mort-
gages with predatory terms, which had 
become all too common starting in the 
late 1990s. As a result of these broad 
shocks and personal experiences, many 
people don’t trust that they will get a 
fair shake as homeowners. That may 
be bad for people individually as well 
as for the economy as a whole because 
residential real estate is big money—
both for individual households and for 
the overall economy. Homes are gener-
ally the single biggest investment that 
families make and are potential engines 
of wealth creation. All of these indi-
vidual investments combine to create 
a residential real estate market worth 
roughly $27 trillion toward the end of 
2018. Urban Institute, Housing Finance 
At A Glance: A Monthly Chartbook 6 
(Dec. 2018). By way of comparison, the 
market capitalization of all domestic 
companies listed on US stock exchanges 
was about $30 trillion at the end of that 
year. 
The Wilshire 5000 Total Market 
IndexSM measures the “performance of 
all U.S. equity securities.” Wilshire Asso-
ciates, Wilshire 5000 Family: Wilshire 
5000 Total Market Index, 
https://wilshire.com/indexes/
wilshire-5000-family/wilshire-5000-to-
tal-market-index (last visited Feb. 17, 
2019). The Wilshire 5000 was at 25,750 
at the end of 2018. MarketWatch, 
https://www.marketwatch.com/invest-
ing/index/w5000?countrycode=xx. 
Each point of the index is equivalent to 
about $1.15 billion, so the market capi-
talization of all domestic equities listed 
on US stock exchanges was a bit under 
$30 trillion. See Wilshire Association, 
Wilshire 5000: Myths and Misconcep-
tions 5 (Nov. 2014), https://wilshire.
com/Portals/0/analytics/research/wp/
wilshire5000myths.pdf.
The run-up to the inancial crisis 
saw the wealth-creation engine go full 
throttle, as home equity increased by 
more than $7 trillion between 2004 and 
2006. Urban Institute, supra, at 6. But 
from 2007 through 2011, residential 
real estate lost more than $6 trillion in 
value, devastating countless homeown-
ers and driving many investors to ruin. 
See id.
There is no question that housing 
inance has a tremendous efect on 
America as well as on Americans. But 
how should the post-crisis discussion 
of the topic be framed? Is the subprime 
crisis-foreclosure crisis a story about a 
free market run wild or a story about 
out-of-control government regulation? 
On the surface, the massive residential 
real estate sector has some of the char-
acteristics of a free market. Innumerable 
buyers and sellers negotiate, agree on 
prices, and close millions of transac-
tions each year. But undergirding that 
market is a whole host of government 
interventions in every aspect of the 
transaction. The federal government 
exerts an extraordinary amount of con-
trol in the housing inance market in 
particular, most notably by subsidizing 
a shockingly large proportion of mort-
gages. About 60 percent of the roughly 
$10 trillion in outstanding residential 
mortgage debt is backed by federally-
related entities. Id.
New Deal to Big Short
This government-dominated housing 
inance system of today grew up piece-
meal from the earliest days of President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s administration. 
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The New Deal included a variety of 
interventions such as the creation of 
the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
Housing Administration. These inter-
ventions were made to address the 
catastrophic failure of the housing and 
housing inance markets that were part 
and parcel of the Great Depression. 
In the eight-plus decades since then, 
the federal government has repeat-
edly intervened in the housing inance 
market to achieve a range of additional 
goals, but policymakers have rarely 
stopped to thoroughly consider when 
it makes sense for the government to 
intervene and when it makes sense to 
let markets operate on their own. The 
2008 inancial crisis provides an oppor-
tunity to design a housing inance 
system that lets the free market concen-
trate on its strength (pricing risk) and 
permits the government to focus on reg-
ulating and subsidizing aspects of that 
market to achieve various consumer 
protection, redistributive, and safety 
goals.
Although this may sound reasonable 
enough, it is in fact highly contested. 
Some inluential members of Con-
gress believe that the government 
should have no role at all in the hous-
ing inance market. Jeb Hensarling, 
who just stepped down from Congress 
and his position as Chair of the House 
Financial Services Committee, was the 
most inluential proponent of this view 
in recent years. His Financial Choice Act 
passed the House in 2017 but did not 
gain traction in the Senate. Neil Hag-
gerty, An Uncompromising Jeb Hensarling 
Is Not Sorry, American Banker (Oct. 14, 
2018), https://www.americanbanker.
com/news/an-uncompromising-jeb-
hensarling-is-not-sorry. The Financial 
Choice Act relected his free-market 
approach to housing inance and those 
of the other Republicans who sup-
ported it. Id. Others, including many 
in government and in policy circles, 
believe that the housing market is too 
important to leave to market forces and 
proit-maximizing private actors. The 
Obama Administration acknowledged 
that a number of experts and advocates 
argued for nationalization in the years 
ater the inancial crisis, though the 
administration itself did not agree with 
that approach. Department of Treasury, 
Reforming America’s Housing Finance 
Market: A Report to Congress 26 (Feb. 
2011). Indeed, a surprising array of peo-
ple support nationalizing more of the 
housing inance market. For instance, 
former Treasury Secretary Paulson, a 
George W. Bush appointee, raised the 
idea ater Fannie and Freddie entered 
conservatorship. James R. Hagerty, Paul-
son: Redo Fannie, Freddie, Wall St. J., Jan. 
8, 2009, at A11. They believe that the 
government should continue playing 
the dominant role.
Within this polarized debate, there is 
a middle ground: Free markets should 
be allowed to work in the absence of 
market failures, but the government 
should intervene to correct any market 
failures that emerge. The government 
also could subsidize entry into the 
housing market for those who would 
otherwise not have access.
Three Housing Principles
A framework for a discussion of the 
future of American housing inance 
policy should consider the three main 
housing policy principles that have 
informed federal housing policy: allow-
ing all Americans to live in a safe, 
well-maintained, and afordable hous-
ing unit; providing a specialized form of 
income redistribution that ensures that 
the income transferred is consumed in 
increased housing; and incentivizing 
Americans to take on the key attributes 
of the Jefersonian yeoman farmer, 
economic self-suiciency as well as a 
jealous regard for one’s liberty. A pol-
icy guided by the irst principle would 
emphasize housing for very low-income 
households that would not be able to 
pay market rates for safe, well-main-
tained, and afordable housing. A policy 
guided by the second principle would 
likely contemplate some kind of pro-
gressive housing subsidy for a broader 
range of low and moderate-income 
households. Finally, a policy guided by 
the third principle would seek to maxi-
mize the homeownership rate for the 
nation as a whole.
We can reinvent the housing inance 
system to meet the needs of twenty-
irst-century Americans by focusing 
on these housing policy principles 
and goals—regardless of whether they 
were met in the past. Having identiied 
these legitimate principles of housing 
policy, we can then evaluate housing 
programs to see whether they achieve 
goals consistent with some or all of 
those principles or whether they work 
at cross-purposes. This process should 
help to clarify debates surrounding 
American housing policy and set the 
stage for the development of future 
policies that will prevent the stack of 
wooden blocks from again crashing 
down. If we succeed, most Americans 
will have a good feeling about their 
homes and will not notice the massive 
regulatory infrastructure that makes 
it all possible. If we fail, our children 
and grandchildren may have di culty 
enjoying the inancial and emotional 
beneits of homeownership, ind-
ing themselves living in the wretched 
Pottersville that threatens to replace 
Bedford Falls when George Bailey gives 
up hope in himself and his community.
Homeownership Policy in The 
Trump Era
The divisive nature of contemporary 
politics afects federal homeownership 
policy along with just about every other 
area of social policy. But there are still 
some areas of bipartisan agreement. 
Free markets should be 
allowed to work in the 
absence of market failures, 
but the government 
should intervene to correct 
any market failures 
that emerge. 
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Many believe in some version of the 
three housing principles. There is a 
longstanding commitment to the idea 
that the federal government should 
help Americans to live in safe, well-
maintained, and afordable housing. 
Moreover, a broad array of Democrats 
and many Republicans favor poli-
cies that increase the homeownership 
rate. Republicans in particular believe 
that homeownership is fundamental 
to the American notion of citizenship. 
The question is whether our currently 
divided government can come up with 
a compromise that outlines a coherent 
role for the government in the housing 
market to act on those principles. So far, 
Congress has not been able to do that.
There have, however, been big 
changes on the administrative front. 
The Executive Branch can have an efect 
on housing policy without input from 
Congress. During its irst two years, 
the Trump Administration has taken 
actions that are inconsistent with long-
standing, bipartisan commitments to 
broadening access to homeownership 
opportunities. See, e.g., David Reiss, 
The Trump Administration and Residen-
tial Real Estate Finance, Westlaw Journal, 
Derivatives 3 (Jan. 25, 2018). Hous-
ing and Urban Development Secretary 
Benjamin Carson has dramatically cur-
tailed fair housing enforcement. Tracy 
Jan, HUD Secretary Ben Carson Doubles 
Down on Dismantling Obama-Era Fair-
Housing Policies, Wash. Post, May 19, 
2018. Carson has had a big assist from 
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin 
and Comptroller of the Currency Joseph 
Otting, who have been working to scale 
back fair lending enforcement and the 
Community Reinvestment Act. Evan 
Weinberger, Banks Look to Narrow 
Exams Under Community Reinvestment 
Act, Bloomberg Law Banking (Dec. 3, 
2018).
Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau Acting Director Mick Mul-
vaney defanged consumer protection 
in the mortgage market over the course 
of 2018. Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: 
The Assault on the Structure of the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (Dec. 
9, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3285589. The 
jury is out on what recently-appointed 
CFPB Director Kathy Kraninger plans to 
do, but it is reasonable to assume that 
her agenda aligns with Mulvaney’s, as 
he put her forward for the job. From the 
perspective of an advocate of afordable 
and sustainable housing, there is a lot 
to dislike in the Trump agenda.
Things are somewhat more tex-
tured when it comes to housing inance 
reform though. With the start of the 
new year, the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac’s regulator, has gone from 
Democratic to Republican control. The 
ive-year term of President Obama’s 
appointee as FHFA Director, Melvin 
Watt, ended at the start of the year. 
President Trump has nominated Vice-
President Pence’s Chief Economist, 
Mark Calabria, to be the permanent 
director. Calabria is a housing inance 
expert and is likely to be conirmed. 
This means that the Trump administra-
tion will be fully in charge of the FHFA 
for the irst time later this year.
Given his previous statements, Cal-
abria’s FHFA will likely reduce the 
footprint of Fannie and Freddie in the 
mortgage market. Hannah Lang, What 
Calabria at FHFA Would Mean for GSE 
Reform, Am. Banker, Dec. 10, 2018. This 
will likely modestly increase the interest 
rates charged on mortgages but will also 
reduce the likelihood of taxpayer bail-
outs. This change in control will also 
likely mean fewer low-down payment 
loan options will be ofered by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, which will put 
downward pressure on the homeowner-
ship rate.
Calabria would be right to seek to 
redistribute credit risk in the mortgage 
market from the government to the pri-
vate sector. This is a good thing because 
it would put the housing inance sys-
tem on a stronger footing for the irst 
time in a long time—since the inancial 
crisis, it has been too dependent on the 
government.
Some believe that the government’s 
current high level of involvement in the 
mortgage market is a positive develop-
ment because of the predatory behavior 
of private actors in the years leading 
up to the crisis. The author has argued 
elsewhere that a properly regulated 
mortgage market would allow the pri-
vate sector to do what it does better 
than the government—evaluate and 
hold credit risk —while leaving the 
federal government to focus on imple-
menting strong consumer protection; 
safety and soundness; and system risk 
regulation. David J. Reiss, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac and the Future of Fed-
eral Housing Finance Policy: A Study of 
Regulatory Privilege, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 907 
(2010).
Conclusion
Those who believe that government 
plays a positive role in the housing 
market by supporting afordable and 
sustainable homeownership have a ight 
ahead of them to move their agenda for-
ward. The move to redistribute credit 
risk in the mortgage market from the 
government to the private sector should 
be seen as a step in the direction of cre-
ating a healthy market for mortgages 
that appropriately balances the role of 
the federal government with that of 
the private sector. But the jury is still 
out on whether the right type of regula-
tion will be in place as the private sector 
gains market share under Calabria’s free 
market initiatives. Although this is not 
a hopeful conclusion for advocates of 
afordable and sustainable housing, it is 
the best we can hope for until Congress 
returns to bipartisan ground to build a 
strong and resilient housing inance sys-
tem for a broad swath of 21st century 
Americans. n
The move to redistribute 
credit risk in the 
mortgage market from the 
government to the private 
sector should be seen as 
a step in the direction of 
creating a healthy market 
for mortgages. 
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